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ABSTRACT
Multi-hop wireless network are promising techniques in thefield of wireless communi-
cation. The dynamic topology of the network and the independent selfish participants of
the network make it difficult to be modeled by traditional tools. Game theory is one of
the most powerful tools for such problems. However, most current works have certain
limitations. There has not been a widely accepted solution for the problem yet.
In this thesis we propose our solutions for the problem of bandwidth sharing in wire-
less networks. We assume the nodes are rational, selfish, butnot malicious, independent
agents in the game. In our model, nodes are trying to send their data to the gateway. Some
nodes may require others to forward their packets to successfully connect to the gateway.
However, nodes are selfish and do not wish to help others. Therefor it is possible that
some nodes may refuse the requirement. In that case, the unplasant nodes may punish
the others by slowing down their traffic, in which case both parties will suffer. Therefore
it is non-trivial to find out the equilibrium for these nodes after the bargaining process.
What is the proper distribution of resources among these nods? We propose a solution
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1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks play an indispensable role in today’s world. Multi-hop wireless net-
works, such asad hocnetworks, wireless mesh networks, and community mesh net-
works, have been studied since the 1970’s. They became popular and received tremen-
dous research interest recently. However, incentives for co peration inad hocnetworks
and fairness in wireless mesh networks are currently big problems. In wireless multi-hop
networks, there is currently no widely-accepted techniqueto compensate users for their
forwarding services [17]. Good economic models are desiredto support the operation of
these networks. We introduce the concept of the Raiffa Solution from game theory and
propose a cooperative game model to study the behavior of nodes in multi-hop wireless
networks.
1.1 MOTIVATION
Multi-hop wireless networks are promising techniques in computer science. Inad hoc
wireless networks, the topology is not fixed as in traditional networks. New nodes may
join in or leave a network at any time. All nodes may forward others’ packets and also
require other nodes to forward their own packets. The network orks best when all the
nodes are not selfish, but cooperate well with each other.
In ad hocnetworks interesting problems arise from the fact that the participants do
not necessarily have an incentive to cooperate with each other. The behavior of nodes
is not defined in the protocol. Therefore the nodes are somehow similar to agents in a
game situation. They are selfish, but not malicious; they arerational, but easily run into
the situation of the “prisoner’s dilemma”, where each node hopes the other nodes will
1
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forward its packets while it does not forward packets from the other nodes. However,
if every node acts in this way, the network would be non-existnt, since no node would
forward any other node’s packets.
In wireless mesh networks we can force the nodes to cooperate. However, just like
the difference of market economics and planned economics, the bandwidth schedule is
usually unfair to the some of the nodes [13]. It causes fairness problems in wireless
mesh networks, which received a lot of research interest recently.
We want to build a model that helps us understand the role of nodes in such a game,
and reveals the equilibrium in such a game. These studies will also help us understand
fairness from a new perspective.
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
In this thesis we propose our solutions for the bandwidth sharing problem. We assume the
nodes are rational, selfish, but not malicious, independentagents in the game. Our model
works when every node is trying to compete with other nodes for m re bandwidth. The
incentive for the nodes to forward others’ packets is the fact that if they do not cooperate
the other nodes may punish them by competing more stringently a d they will get less
bandwidth in this case. We modeled the idea of “cooperation while threatening” in this
thesis.
We adopt the cooperative-game model to solve the problem. Wefirst study the two-
node game where we accept the solution proposed by Raiffa [16, 18, 21]. Then we claim
that there are only two basic ways nodes can participate in the etwork, either completely
competing or completely cooperating. We use the routing tree to represent the network
topology. By treating a subtree as the same as a node in the gam, we reduce the game
to a two-player game, recursively. An algorithm to determine the appropriate bandwidth
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allocation among the nodes in the system is then proposed.
The solution works well for networks without concurrent transmissions. For larger
networks that are not in a single collision domain, we adopt the method from Jakubczak
et al [12] and propose a more-realistic solution for wireless mesh networks.
Our contributions include:
1. We formalize the two-node game and solve the game.
2. We generalize the model to solve multi-node games.
3. We simulate our approach using thens-2simulator.
4. We find out that our solution leads to temporal fairness when t nodes are coop-
erating, subject to certain conditions which are non-trivial.
1.3 THESISSTRUCTURE
The rest of the thesis consists of the following chapters. InChapter 2 we present a survey
on the background and related work as well as introduce some basic knowledge of game
theory which is most related to our work. In Chapter 3 we present our model in the
order we studied the problems. In Chapter 4 we take interference range into account and
discuss the simulation results. We present our conclusion and future work in Chapter 5.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this chapter we review the basics of wireless networks andgame theory. We show there
are incentive and fairness problems in multi-hop wireless networks. We show why game
theory is desired in wireless networks. We also introduce the related work in applying
game theory in wireless networks.
2.1 WIRELESSNETWORKS
Wireless networks consist of nodes that are not connected with wires or fibers, but com-
municate through radio signals. Wireless communications ca be modeled by transmis-
sion range and interference range. The transmission range ad interference range are
usually from several meters to several kilometers. The transmission range is smaller than
the interference range. If the receiver is within transmission range of the sender, the re-
ceiver can successfully receive the signal from the sender and decode the message. If
the receiver is out of interference range of the sender, the rec ive can neither receive nor
sense the signal from the sender. If the receiver is within interference range, but out of
transmission range of the sender, it cannot receive the signal. However, it can sense the
signal and the interference may cause it fail to receive fromanother sender.
Some of the nodes in the wireless network may be connected by wire to the Internet.
We call such nodes gateways. Usually several nodes connect to one gateway to access
the Internet, and form the many-to-one traffic.
5
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2.1.1 MULTI -HOP WIRELESSNETWORKS
If two nodes are not within each other’s transmission range,th y cannot communicate
directly. However, if there exists another node which is within the transmission range
of both nodes and agrees to forward data for them, they can communicate with each
other via the intermediate node. Sometimes the network flow may traverse multiple such
intermediate nodes. We call such networks multi-hop wireless networks [1, 3].
In a multi-hop wireless network, nodes have to join the network t benefit from the
network, while having the obligation to forward other nodes’ packets. The problem is,
because of energy and bandwidth limitations, nodes would not wish to forward these
packets. Thus the problem arises: how to decide whether or not to f rward data, and
how to decide the proper portion of the received data that will be forwarded? A lot of
interesting discussions and research arises from these problems.
2.1.2 Ad-hocWIRELESSNETWORKS
Ad-hocnetworks [22] are one example of multi-hop wireless networks. Ad-hocnetworks
are wireless networks without fixed infrastructure or centralized administration. Such
networks are instantaneously formed when interested nodescome within each other’s
transmission range.Ad-hocnetworks can be very useful in situations where there is no
need for an infrastructure or where its creation would be tooc stly. Sometimes nodes in
ad-hocnetworks are powered by batteries and only participate in the network for a short
time. The advantages ofad-hocnetworks include: it is very fast to deploy the network;
it is robust to changes; it is flexible; it allows nodes in the network with either high or
low mobility, etc.
A lot of research has studied how to motivate nodes to cooperate with each other to
make the network operate well. We will survey these works in the last section of this
2.2. GAME THEORY 7
chapter.
2.1.3 WIRELESSMESH NETWORKS
Another example of multi-hop wireless networks is called Wireless Mesh Networks [3,
8]. These networks are composed of regular mesh nodes that acas both data sources/sinks
and as routers, and gateway nodes that bridge traffic betweenth mesh and the wired net-
work (usually the Internet) [4]. The traffic in a Wireless Mesh network is usually from
one of the node to the gateway, or the reverse.
Generally there exists a single administrative authority in w reless mesh networks.
Nodes are designed to work appropriately.
2.1.4 COMMUNITY MESH NETWORKS
Neighbors connecting their home networks together with radios form a Community
Mesh Network. When enough neighbors cooperate and forward ech others packets,
they do not need to individually install a gateway but instead c n share Internet access
via gateways that are distributed in their neighborhood. Packets dynamically find a route,
hopping from one neighbor’s node to another to reach the Interne through one of these
gateways.
In our model, we assume low mobility, no power constraints, and no single admin-
istrative domain. Therefore, our model works best in the situat on of community mesh
networks.
2.2 GAME THEORY
Game theory is the mathematical study of the interaction among independent, self-
interested agents. It has been applied to a wide range of fields including economics,
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political science, biology, psychology, linguistics, andcomputer science. This section
introduces some basic knowledge of game theory, which will be referred to in the re-
minder of the thesis. Most of the contents of the sections come from the book of Von
Neumann et al [16, 18].
2.2.1 BASIC ELEMENTS OF A GAME
The basic elements of a game consist of the participants of the game, the action space of
these participants, the consequences of these actions, andthe preference (utility) of these
participants.
2.2.1.1 SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS
The participants of a game are self-interested independentagents. “Self-interested” does
not necessarily mean that agents want to cause harm to each other. Instead, it means
that each agent has its own description of which states of theworld it prefers, which
can include good things happening to other agents and that itac s to make these states
realized.
In multi-hop networks we discuss in this thesis, we assume the nodes are self-interested
agents only caring for themselves.
2.2.1.2 UTILITY
Each agent may have different preferences for the same outcome of a game. Utility is the
numerical value that represents the preference of the agents. For a fixed playerP , and
two outcomesM andN , the utility functionU() satisfies:U(M) < U(N) if and only if
P prefersN to M .
The expected-utility hypothesis widely accepted in the field of game theory. The
hypothesis asserts that when faced with uncertainty about which outcomes it will receive,
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the agent prefers outcomes that maximize its expected utility. If the utility function
satisfies this hypothesis, then we say the utility function is linear.
The absolute value of the utility function evaluated at different outcomes is unim-
portant. Instead, every positive affine transformation of autility function yields another
utility function for the same agent. In other words, ifU(A) is a linear utility function for
a given agent A thenU ′(A) = aU(A) + b is also a linear utility function for the same
agent, ifa andb are constants anda is positive. Therefore, we can always perform a
linear transformation on a utility function without changi the preference represented
by that utility function. In many situations people linearly transform the utility functions
such that the utility ranges from 0 to 1.
2.2.1.3 ACTION SPACE
The action space is the set of actions an agent can take. In many situations each agent
has exactly two actions that it can choose from. The smaller the action space is, the more
such games have been studied. Games with an infinite action space are generally hard to
analyze.
2.2.1.4 OUTCOME OF A GAME
Once each agent chooses an action from the action space, therwill be some outcome
of the game. Sometimes there are several steps in each of which the agents have to take
actions. In the view of game theory, the outcome can be expressed as an array of utilities
of all the agents, which reflects the preferences of the agents to the outcome.
2.2.2 TWO-PLAYER NORMAL-FORM GAME
Two-player normal-form games are the most-studied games. In this case the game can
be represented by a payoff matrix. In the matrix all four possible combinations of the
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agents’ actions are shown, and the utility of the two agents ieach outcome is given.
Here we introduce some examples of two-player normal-form ga es.
2.2.2.1 PRISONER’ S DILEMMA
The most famous game in game theory is the prisoner’s dilemma. The story is: suspect 1
and suspect 2 are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a con-
viction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of t em to offer the same deal:
if one testifies for the prosecution against the other and theo r remains silent, the be-
trayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full10-year sentence. If both stay
silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each
betrays the other, each receives a two-year sentence. Each prisoner must make the choice
of whether to betray the other or to remain silent. However, nither prisoner knows for
sure what choice the other prisoner will make. This dilemma poses the question: how
should the prisoners act?
The game may be represented by the payoff matrix shown in Table (2.1), where we
assume the utility of each agent is simply zero minus the number of years in prison.
2.2.2.2 BATTLE OF SEXES
Imagine a couple, husband and wife. The husband prefers to gothe football game.
The wife would like to go to the opera. Both would prefer to go to the same place rather
than different ones. Where should they go?
The payoff matrix is shown in Table (2.2).
2.2.3 PARETO EFFICIENCY
Pareto efficiency is usually a desirable requirement for anysolution of a game. A strategy
profile is said to be Pareto efficient if for any other strategyprofile, there will be at least
2.2. GAME THEORY 11
Suspect 2
Stays silent Betrays






Table 2.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
one agent with lower utility. The principle is that if some ofthe agents can get higher
utility without harming other agents, they should. It is natur l to expect Pareto efficiency
in any solution.
2.2.4 STRATEGY
The strategy of an agent may be any action from the actions space, or a combination
of them. We use the notation(p1A1, p2A2, . . . , pnAn), where
∑n
k=1 pn = 1 to denote a
strategy of an agent. The strategy means the agent would playactionAi with probability
pi, wherei = 1, 2, . . . , n. If one of thesepi’s is 1, then it is called a pure strategy;
otherwise, it is called a mixed strategy.
A strategy profile is an array of strategies of each agent in the game. For example,
let the strategy for playeri ∈ 1, 2, . . . , k besi, thens = {s1, ..., sk} is a strategy profile.
The solution of a game can be represented by a strategy profile.
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Wife
Football Opera
Husband Football (2,1) (0,0)
Opera (0,0) (1,2)
Table 2.2: Battle of Sexes
The utility of a strategy profile is a vector of the expected utilities of all the agents
when every one acts according to the strategy.I.e , u(s) = (u1(s), u2(s), . . . , uk(s))
whereui(s) is the expected utility of agenti when agentj playssj, for all j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
2.2.4.1 MAX -MIN STRATEGY
To ensure some certain level of safety, the straightforwardstrategy of a game is the “max-
min” strategy, in which case the agent chooses its action from the action space such that
it maximizes its worse-case payoff. The rational of this strategy is obvious: choosing
any other action may lead to some outcome where the agent getsa lower utility.
2.2.4.2 DOMINATED STRATEGY
To define dominated strategy, we use the following notation.Given a strategy profile
s = {s1, ..., sn}, we defines−i = {s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn}, and{si, s−i} = s.
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Definition 1 (Dominated strategy) For some agent i, if there exist two strategiessi, si∗ ∈
Si such thatui(si, s−i) ≤ ui(si∗, s−i) for all strategies of the other agentss−i and for at
least one strategys−i, ui(si, s−i) < ui(si∗, s−i) , then we say the strategysi is dominated
by si∗. If ui(si, s−i) < ui(si∗, s−i) for all strategies of the other agentss−i, then we say
the strategysi is strictly dominated bysi∗.
The dominated strategy should not be used.
2.2.5 NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The Nash Equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no playerhas anything to gain by
changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally. It is thelik ly outcome of a game if
agents are non-cooperative;i.e., they do not communicate with each other and choose
the actions by themselves. The formal definition is constructed as follows:
Definition 2 (Best response to a strategy profile)A best response of Playeri to the
strategy profiles−i is a mixed strategysi∗ ∈ Si such thatui(si∗, s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i)
for all strategiessi ∈ Si.
The best response may not be unique.
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium) A strategy profiles = (s1, . . . , sn) is a Nash equilib-
rium if, for all agentsi, si is a best response tos−i.
In other words the Nash Equilibrium is a strategy profile where no agent can benefit
by playing any other strategy if the other agents do not change their strategy. Therefore,
the Nash Equilibrium is a stable outcome of the game. However, since the best response
may not be unique, the Nash Equilibrium may not be unique either.
Sometimes we can find the Nash Equilibrium of a game by deleting the dominated
strategies from the Payoff matrix. For example, recall the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma
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illustrated in Table (2.1). “Stay Silent” is dominated by “Betray” for both A and B. If
we delete the outcomes related to “Stay Silent” of both A and B, there will be only one
outcome left, which is the Nash Equilibrium of the game: bothagents betray.
2.2.6 COOPERATIVEGAME
In a cooperative game the agents can communicate with each other and take actions after
they have an agreement. The communication makes some cooperative strategy feasible.
For example, assume there are two agents,1 and2. The action space of1 is A1, A2, and
the action space of2 is B1, B2. Then a cooperative strategy may be
{p1(A1, B1), p2(A2, B2)}, which means with probabilityp1, agent1 playsA1 and agent
2 playsB1; with probabilityp2, agent1 playsA2 and agent2 playsB2.
The above cooperative strategy is impossible to carried outunless the agents can
communicate with each other and agree to cooperate. We will show examples where
the cooperative strategy performs much better than either the Nash Equilibrium or the
max-min strategy in a cooperative game.
In the game of “Prisoner’s dilemma”, as illustrated in Table2.1, one easily identifies
that both the Nash Equilibrium and the max-min strategy leadto the outcome{Betrays,
Betrays}. The utility of both agents will be−2. On the other hand, the cooperative
strategy is{1(Stay silent, Stay silent)}, where both agents get a utility of−0.5. However,
it is impossible to reach to the cooperative optimal unless the agents can communicate
and there exists some way to enforce the cooperative strategies.
In the game “Battle of sexes”, there are three Nash Equilibria {Football, Football}
(where the husband gets utility 2 and the wife gets utility 1), {Opera, Opera} (where
the husband gets utility 1 and the wife gets utility 2) and{(0.75 Football, 0.25 Opera),
(0.25 Football, 0.75 Opera)} (where both get expected utility 0.75). However, none
of these are good solutions for the game. Instead, in the caseof a cooperative game
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where agents can communicate, we have the optimal solution{0.5(Football, Football),
0.5(Opera, Opera)}, where both agents get expected utility1.5.
The cooperative solution is difficult to implement unless the agents can communicate
with each other and the game is repeated for many times. However, it is usually reason-
able to assume the availability of communication and repetition, especially in a wireless
network. In general, cooperative solutions may be much better than non-cooperative
ones.
2.2.7 RAIFFA SOLUTION
In the thesis we adopt the Raiffa solution to find the outcome in a cooperative game. We
introduce it in this section.
For two player games we can use a graph to help us understand the i ea of Raiffa
solution. For any strategy profiles = (sA, sB), we will have an outcome of the game and
the utility is (U(A), U(B)). Since it is a cooperative game with mixed strategies, if we
plot all possible outcome utility points(U(A), U(B)) in a graph, we have a convex set
as shown in Figure 2.1
Figure 2.1: All possible outcome of the game
However, not all of these outcomes are possible in a game. Theagents will not
adopt dominated strategies; using max-min reasoning they can also guarantee themselves
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some minimal level of utility. We call the utility in the max-min strategy of an agent
the security level. Only the outcomes that equal or exceed thsecurity-level point are
possible, as illustrated in Figure 2.2
Figure 2.2: Security Level: only the grey area is feasible
By Pareto efficiency, the outcomes on the boundary form the optimal sets, as depicted
in Figure 2.3; the points not on the boundary are always dominated by some other point
on the boundary. Therefore, a cooperative solution should be on the black line in Figure
2.4.
Figure 2.3: Any outcome not on the boundary is not preferable
Adding the last constraint will lead to the Raiffa solution.Raiffa suggests the reason-
able solution should be on the 45-degree line starting from the security-level point. In
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Figure 2.4: Pareto efficiency
other words, the difference between the security level of the two agents should be main-
tained in the solution. As illustrated in Figure 2.5, any point not on the 45-degree line,
like the white points, will cause unfairness. The consequence of unfairness is that agent
A may threaten B that it will terminate the cooperation, in which case the new equilib-
rium points will be the security level, and therefore agent Bloses more utility than A
does.
Figure 2.5: 45-degree fair line
The above reasoning suggests that the Raiffa solution is thedeal solution concept for
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cooperative games. We adopt the solution idea in our studies.
2.3 GAME THEORY IN WIRELESSNETWORKS
There is a lot of research studying wireless networks from the game-theory view recently
(e.g., see [2, 5]), especially forad hocwireless networks. It is not surprising that many
people try to explain the behavior of nodes inad hocnetworks as a game. The topology
structure ofad-hocnetworks is extremely dynamic; nodes may join or leave the network
arbitrarily according to their own interest. Even if a node stay in the network, it may de-
cide on its own to forward the packets of other nodes or not. Therefore,ad hocnetworks
form a typical situation where a game is played between ration l agents.
Most such research assumes that the nodes are selfish, but notmalicious, independent
agents in a game. Most game-theory-based approaches falls in two categories: reputation
mechanism and virtual-currency mechanism.
The reputation mechanism assumes that each node should forward all the packets and
nodes can monitor the behavior of its neighborhood. Any misbehavior will be reported,
and any node that does not forward packets will not be able to ge its own packets for-
warded in the future [26]. However, this mechanism does not tell us how many packets
should be forwarded; it assumes all packets should be forwarded. Our focus is on what
the reasonable expectation is of packets to be forwarded.
The virtual-currency mechanism assumes there exists some fr of virtual currency
in the networks such that nodes can earn money by forwarding packets or make other
contributions, and need to pay money to get their own packetssent [11]. This method,
along with the well-studied VCG [24] payment mechanism, seems to be a good solution
for the problem. However, it may be very complex.
Both mechanism are promising ways. However, it may not be easy to implement
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reputation or banking services in the network. In this thesis, the factor we are concerned
with is the proper proportion of bandwidth that is allocatedfor these nodes. Therefore,
we are studying the problem from a different aspect from these works.
2.3.1 ENERGY CONSTRAINTS
The bottleneck for most nodes inad hocnetworks may be energy constraints. It costs
energy for nodes to act as routers for others. For mobile nodes, energy may be a very
limited resource and usually should be reserved for the nodeitself.
A lot of research starts from the energy constraint (e.g., [25]). However, power is not
a major constraint for nodes in community wireless networks. In this thesis we will not
take energy constraints into account. Rather, we focus on thr ug put.
2.3.2 NASH EQUILIBRIUM
A lot of research models the network as a non-cooperative game (e.g., [19]). Each
node tries to maximize its own utility. It is widely acceptedthat the Nash Equilibrium is
usually the outcome of such a game. However, we do not prefer the Nash Equilbirium
because of the following reasons:
1. Sometimes the Nash Equilibrium is far from optimal, as in the famous game “Pris-
onner’s Dilemma”.
2. We prefer to model the network as a cooperative game, in which case agents can
improve each other’s utility by wise cooperation which cannot be taken in the Nash
Equilibrium of a non-cooperative game.
3. It is still an open problem to find the equilibrium point in aefficient way when
there are a lot of agents in the game. It is now known that finding a Nash Equilib-
rium with even 2-players belongs to PPAD which is thought to be harder than P.
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Moreover, finding a Nash Equilibrium that max social welfareis NP hard. In fact,
most research in this category differ in their ways to find theNash equilibrium, or
in their mechanisms whose outcome will converge to the Nash equilibrium with
high probability.
2.3.3 MAXIMIZE THE AGGREGATEUTILITY
Some research assigns the resources among agents such that te sum of the utility of
all nodes is maximized [6, 9]. However, it is unclear whetherthis assignment will be
advocated by the nodes or not. Not surprisingly, in many cases maximizing social welfare
means some nodes have to sacrifice. Since each node is an independent agent, we do not
think it will accept the aggregate-utility maximizing assignment if it conflicts with the
node’s own interest. If there exists any node which can improve its utility if it plays some
other strategy, the cooperation has to be unstable. Instead, in both the Nash equilibrium
and our solution, nodes are not supposed to sacrifice for aggregate utility.
2.4 FAIRNESS IN WIRELESSMESH NETWORKS
In wireless mesh networks, operators enforce cooperation through predefined protocols
or programs. For example, gateway control [13] controls theresource distribution in
wireless mesh networks such that every node get a fair (as pursued in the work) through-
put.
Ad hocnetworks and community mesh networks are more suitable to bemodeled
as a game, since the decision of forwarding packets is made individually based on the
individual interest of the nodes. On the other hand, in wireless mesh networks where
nodes do not have the right to make a decision the incentive problem appears in the form
of fairness. After the network operator has made a policy decision, people would ask: is
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this a fair resource assignment? [20]
Current wireless mesh networks based on the IEEE 802.11 MAC and standard network-
layer protocols cannot provide fairness to each node in the network. In particular, it has
been demonstrated that nodes close to the gateway can starveor e n shut off those that
are more hops away without rate-control mechanisms [13]. However, it is not self-
evident that different nodes having different bandwidth isunfair. We have to note the
fact that different nodes in the network are indeed not symmetric and some may con-
tribute much more for the network. A very deliberate design decision has to be made to
advocate for any “fair” schedule.
We study the problem in this way: assume the nodes are free agents as in other multi-
hop wireless networks, then find the cooperative outcome of the game, and compare it
with existing fairness conceptions.
Before we start our analysis, we show some well-known definitio s of fairness below.
Some forms of fairness are with respect to cost, and some others ar with respect to
outcome.
2.4.1 ABSOLUTE FAIRNESS
Some people referring to absolute fairness require fairness with respect to the outcome.
Under absolute fairness with respect to outcome, the rates are equally distributed between
all the streams. All the nodes in the network get the same throughput.
2.4.2 MAX -MIN FAIRNESS
Assume each node get a fair share of throughput defined by absolute fairness. Sometimes
the network topology is such that a few nodes can improve their roughput without any
other node’s throughput decreasing. Therefore, it is not necessary to insist that all nodes
should get the same throughput.
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The definition of max-min fairness [20] assumes a single bottleneck. All nodes that
are limited by the bottleneck get equal share of the bottleneck link. Other nodes can get
higher throughput.
The max-min fairness concept is consistent with the idea of Pareto efficiency. People
observe that in addition to absolute fairness, some nodes inthe etwork can get higher
throughput without reducing the performance of the others.Therefore, people introduce
max-min fairness to maximize the overall throughput, whileproviding basic fairness
guarantees.
2.4.3 PROPORTIONALFAIRNESS
An allocationx is said to be proportionally fair if for any other feasible allocationx′, the






Kelly [14] showed that if the utility function is logarithmic to throughput, and the
fairness goal is to maximize the sum of utility of all the nodes, then we reach proportional
fairness.
2.4.4 TEMPORAL FAIRNESS
The link capacity of different links in the network may be quite different. It is not nec-
essarily fair to have a 55Mbps link have the same throughput as another link which is
only 1Mbps. Temporal fairness [10] considers time, insteadof throughput as the re-
source to be fairly distributed. In temporal fairness, eachstream takes the same amount
of spectrum time to arrive at the gateway, subject to the max-in limitations.
In this thesis, we assume the nodes in the wireless network can make independent
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decisions as inad hocnetworks and community wireless networks. Then we find the
Raiffa equilibrium of the game, and advocate the outcome to be the fair share. We show
that if the utility function is the throughput, the securitylevel of each node is 0, and the
fairness goal is to realize the Raiffa equilibrium, then we reach the temporal fairness.
3 GAMES IN MANY-TO-ONE ROUTING
In this chapter, we focus on those problems where there are many nodes but only one
gateway in the network. As observed by Cheng et al. [7], the network topology will
form a confluent tree. We also make the assumption that no concurrent transmitting is
allowed in such networks. This assumption is true if the network is small and all links
are within each other’s interference range. On the other hand, it may be far from real
life when applied to larger networks. However, making thesea sumptions makes things
easier initially, so we can focus on the game-theory view; this restriction will be removed
in Chapter 4.
This chapter is organized as follows: first, we study some representative specific
examples of the simplest scenario with two nodes; we then apply our solution to general
two-node games; finally, with induction and recursion, we determine the solution for the
general case.
3.1 TWO-NODE GAME : NUMERICAL SCENARIO
The simplest game happens between two nodes. Let us assume there are two nodes,
denoted by A and B, both trying to connect to the gateway O. Depending on the available
links, there are three potential scenarios, as illustratedin Fig.3.1. In Fig. 3.1(a), both A
and B can access O directly, while they cannot communicate with each other. In this case,
the interests of A and B are incompatible. They compete with each other for bandwidth.
In Fig. 3.1(b), A can access O directly, but B can only access Oindirectly if A agrees to
forward B’s packets. In this case B has to cooperate with A to access O. In Fig. 3.1(c),
both A and B can access O directly, while B can also send packets to A and ask A to
25
26 CHAPTER 3. GAMES IN MANY-TO-ONE ROUTING
forward them. Thus, they may be either competing or cooperating with the other party.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.1: Three possible scenarios between two nodes
There are some assumptions and settings throughout the chapter. We assume the
nodes always have data to transmit to the gateway. This is true if the network is busy and
no node has enough bandwidth. This is also a reasonable simplification at the beginning
of the analysis. The objective of these nodes is to get as muchthroughput as possible.
In this chapter, we define the utilityUX of a nodeX to be equal to its throughput,
TX :
UX = UX(TX) = TX (3.1)
Since the throughput of any node in any network must be finite,th range of our
utility for any node is[0,∞).
It might be reasonable to have some more elaborate utility function defined here.
However, it is nontrivial to choose the proper utility functions. Advocating for a certain
utility function for nodes in wireless network is out of thisscope of the thesis; however,
we believe the utility function can be replaced with most other functions (as long as they
are continuous and monotonically increasing) and the solution procedure will still be
effective.
We assume the nodes are selfish. They only care for the interest of themselves. They
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do not wish to contribute to the whole network unless it is beneficial for themselves.
They can make independent decisions as agents do in a typicalgame. As such, each
agent will attempt to maximize its own utility, and not care about the aggregate utility of
the network.
In this section, we will assume all packets are of the same size; the link capacities
are known specific numerical values. We study how the bargainwill proceed and how
equilibrium will be found in the three cases in the followingdiscussions.
3.1.1 COMPETITION GAME
Consider the situation illustrated in Fig. 3.1(a). Assume Acan communicate with O at
10Mb/s and B can communicate with O at 1Mb/s. What is the likely outcome of the
competition?
Let tA be the fraction of time A can access O in one second, andtB be the fraction of
time B can access O in one second.
The utility of node A is given by:
UA = TA = tA × 10 (3.2)
The utility of node B is given by:
UB = TB = tB × 1 (3.3)
By the selfish assumption, both A and B wish to maximize their own utility, therefore
their goal is to get as much time as possible. On the other hand, si ce the network is busy,
we have:
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tA + tB = 1 (3.4)
That is, the interest of A and B are incompatible and there is no way that they can
cooperate to get any better outcome. There is no better strategy other than to compete
with each other for bandwidth. In this case, the 802.11MAC protocol will ensure that
each packet from both parties has the same chance to get transmitted. We assume the
packets are of the same size; therefore:
tA × 10 = tB × 1 (3.5)




Both parties get a throughput of10
11
Mbps.
The same results are reported by Gambiroza et al. [10]. Intuitively, in the equilibrium
both nodes should try to send as much as possible, which results in the above outcome.
We now study this as a normal-form game and advocate this result from the game-theory
view.
The basic elements of the game are:
• The participants of the game: A and B
• Action space of A: A can keep silent, try to send all the time, or try to send some
of the time and keep silent in the rest of the time.
• Action space of B: B can keep silent, try to send all the time, or try to send some
of the time and keep silent in the rest of the time.
It is impossible to write down the payoff matrix for games with infinite actions. We
have to parameterize the action space for each agent. Let theac ion space of X (either A
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or B) be{Active, Silent}. Then the strategy X plays in the game can be expressed as
(pActive, (1− p)Silent), wherep ∈ [0, 1].
This is a mixed strategy formed by the two pure strategies “Silent” and “Active”, andp
is the probability of X being active. Then we have the following game with the payoff
matrix shown in Table (3.1):
• The participants of the game: A and B
• Action space of A: Silent, Active
• Action space of B: Silent, Active
• Strategy of A: (pAActive, (1− pA)Silent);pA ∈ [0, 1]
• Strategy of B: (pBActive, (1− pB)Silent);pB ∈ [0, 1]
B
Silent Active






Table 3.1: Payoff Matrix for the First Game
30 CHAPTER 3. GAMES IN MANY-TO-ONE ROUTING
No matter what strategy B uses, A can always get a higher utility by playing “Active”;
therefore “Silent” is strictly dominated by “Active” for A.For B,“Silent” is also strictly
dominated by “Active”. Thus, the Nash Equilibrium of the game is (Active, Active),
which results in the situation where both agents try to send all the time and finally both
get a throughput of10
11
Mbps.
We will show there is no strategy such thatbothnodes get higher utility; therefore
there is no desire for any cooperation. Assume that in the final outcome of the game the
proportion of (Active, Active) isp1, the proportion of (Active, Silent) isp2, the proportion
of (Silent, Active) isp3, the proportion of (Silent, Silent) isp4. Because at any time, the
nodes must be in one and only one of the four situations, we must have:
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1; pi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (3.6)

















































However, Eq. (3.8)+ Eq. (3.9)×10 yields:
10(p1 + p2 + p3) > 10 (3.10)
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or
p1 + p2 + p3 > 1 (3.11)
which contradicts with Eq. (3.6).
Therefore, there is no outcome of the game wherebothnodes get higher utility than
they do in the Nash Equilibrium. Therefore, the Nash Equilibrium in this game is Pareto
optimal outcome. In other words, the outcome of the game mustbe the Nash Equilibrium.
3.1.2 COOPERATIONGAME
We now consider the second possibility, shown in Fig. 3.1(b)We assume A can com-
municate with O at 10Mbps. B can access A at 10Mbps, but cannotaccess O directly.
There are a lot of possible outcomes of the game. B can keep silent all the time; then
A gets a bandwidth of 10 Mbps and B gets a bandwidth of 0 Mbps. IfB keeps active,
and A does not forward any of B’s data, just trying to send to O,then A gets 5Mbps, and
B gets 0Mbps.
Obviously, neither outcome is favorable to B. On the other hand, the throughput A
gets varies when B adopts different strategies. It is also possible that B sends data and A
forwards some of it. There may be such a conversion between A and B:
• B: Hi friend; can you forward these packets for me?
• A: I do not wish to. If I do, I will have less time to transmit my own data.
• B: If you do not forward my data, I will punish you by keeping active to slow down
your traffic.
• A: Ok; let’s make a deal. I will forward some of your data; pleas don’t bother me
the rest of the time.
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• B: Sounds like a good deal. I will send to you at 3Mbps.
• A: No way; I will forward at most 1Mbps.
• B: ...
Note that this time it is not a zero-sum game. A and B may agree to cooperate. The
difficulty is how to determine the proper allocation of bandwi th between the two nodes.
We analyze the cooperation in the game-theory view.
The basic elements of the game are:
• The participants of the game: A and B
• Action space of A: Forward B’s packets (Cooperative), Send its own packets (Non-
cooperative)
• Action space of B: Keep active or keep silent
The exact definition of these actions needs to be emphasized.A plays “cooperative”
if it forwards all of B’s packets even if this means that A doesnot have time to transmit
its own packets. A plays “Non-cooperative” if it keeps trying to send its own packets,
and never forwards B’s packets. B plays “Keep Silent” if it does not attempt to send any
packets. B plays “Keep Active” if B keeps trying sending all the time. However, since A
is also trying to send (either forwarding B’s or sending A’s own packets), B can succeed
in sending only half the time. Therefore when playing “Keep active”, B sends packets
half the time.
A’s utility is maximized if the strategy profile (Non-cooperative, Keep silent) is car-
ried out. In this case A gets 10Mbps, and B gets 0Mbps. B’s utility is maximized if the
strategy profile (Cooperative, Keep active) is carried out.In his case, B tries to send all
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the time but B can only succeed half the time, because the other half of the time is taken
by A forwarding packets from B. Therefore in this case A gets 0Mbps and B gets 5Mbps.
As in the previous game, the actions they actually play can beconsidered as mixed
strategies of these actions. Then we have the payoff matrix shown in Table 3.2:
B
Silent Active
A Cooperative (10,0) (0,5)
Non-cooperative (10,0) (5,0)
Table 3.2: Payoff Matrix for the Second Game
For A, the strategy “Cooperative” is dominated by “Non-cooperative”. For B, “Silent”
is dominated by “Active”. Then it is straightforward to see tha the pure-strategy Nash
Equilibrium of this game is (Non-cooperative, Active), whic is apparently not what we
wish to happen. However, unlike the first game, there are cooperative outcomes that are
better than the Nash Equilibrium for both nodes. For example, suppose the outcome con-
sists of20% of (Cooperative, Active) and80% of (Non-Cooperative, Silent); the utility
vector shows:






































Therefore we consider the cooperative version of the game, and find the Raiffa solu-
tions with the following steps.
Assume the cooperative strategy profile is
{(p1(Cooperative, Active), p2(Cooperative, Silent), p3(Non−cooperative, Active), p4(Non−
cooperative, Silent)}; p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1, pi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, 3, 4
































UA = 10p2 + 5p3 + 10p4 (3.14)
UB = 5p1 (3.15)
The utility of each agent is normalized such that the best utili y an agent may get is 1
and the worst is 0. LetUX be the utility of X (either A or B). LetMAXUX be the maximal
utility a node X can get andMINUX be the minimal utility it can get. These are fixed
values once the topology and link capacities of the network are given. The normalized
utility of node X,NUX , is a function ofUX (therefore a function ofp1, p2, p3, p4), defined
as:





This is the only linear mapping from the interval of the utility of X, [MINUX , MAXUX ],
to [0, 1]. Any non-linear mapping implicitly changes the underlyingutility functions and
therefore is not preferred. After normalization, the Payoff Matrix is shown in Table 3.3.
B
Silent Active
A Cooperative (1,0) (0,1)
Non-cooperative (1,0) (0.5,0)
Table 3.3: Normalized Payoff Matrix for the Second Game
Therefore, the normalized utility of A and B, as a function ofp1, p2, p3, p4, are given
by:
NUA = p2 + 0.5p3 + p4 (3.17)
NUB = p1 (3.18)
Second, we observe thatA andB have different powers in the bargain.A is much
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stronger since it can ensure itself a normalized utility of 0.5 leavingB with 0 by playing
“non-cooperative”. The difference between nodes is characte ized by the security level.
As introduced in Chapter 2, the security level is the highestutili y a node can guarantee
itself. Any other strategy may lead to lower utility.
The security level,SLX , of a nodeX is the highest utility it can guarantee itself.
From the normalized-utility matrix shown in Table 3.3 we have:
SLA = 0.5 whenA takes “Non-cooperative” (3.19)
SLB = 0 whenB takes either action (3.20)
The normalized utility and security level reveal the asymmetry between the nodes.
Raiffa suggests that the difference between the security levels should be maintained in
the solution profile. If the relative advantage is kept, any agent that unilaterally deviates
from the solution profile will lose at least the same as the other agent does since the
cooperation will be terminated and both will get the utilityof the security level.
The Raiffa solution is given by the following optimization problem:
MaximizeNUA under the constraints:
• NUA −NUB = SLA − SLB
• p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1
• p1, p2, p3, p4 ∈ [0, 1]
Expressing all terms inp1, p2, p3 andp4 the problem becomes:
Maximize
NUA = p2 + 0.5p3 + p4 (3.21)
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given:
p2 + 0.5p3 + p4 − p1 = 0.5 (3.22)
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1 (3.23)
andp1, p2, p3, p4 ∈ [0, 1].
Taking Eq. (3.22) from Eq. (3.21) yields:
NUA = p1 + 0.5 (3.24)
Eq. (3.23)- Eq. (3.22) yields:
2p1 + 0.5p3 = 0.5 (3.25)
Therefore,
p1 = 0.25− 0.25p3 (3.26)
NUA = 0.75− 0.25p3 ≤ 0.75 (3.27)
Therefore,NUA is maximized to be0.75 whenp3 = 0, which yieldsp1 = 0.25 and
p2 + p4 = 0.75.
Therefore, one of the solutions for this game is
{0.25(Cooperative, Active), 0.75(Cooperative, Silent)}; i.e., B should be “active” for
25% of the time, andA should forward all these packets.A has75% of the time to send
its own packets while B keeps silent. In this caseA gets 7.5Mbps andB gets 1.25Mbps.
Both nodes get better throughput than the Nash Equilibrium,whereA gets 5Mbps and
B gets 0Mbps.
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3.1.3 COOPERATION ANDCOMPETITION GAME
We now consider the third possibility, shown in Fig. 3.1(c).We assume thatA can
communicate withO at 10Mbps. B can accessA at 10Mbps, and also accessO at
1Mbps. First, we identify the participants and their actionspaces:
• The participants of the game:A andB
• Action space ofA: Cooperative or Non-cooperative
• Action space ofB: Keep silent, send to A or send to O
The difference in this case from the scenario in Section 3.1.2 lies in the fact that B can
access O directly. However, the link between B and O is weaker, so the more-efficient
way is that B sends its packets to A, which will hopefully forward them to O. If B keeps
sending to O, thus competing with A, the traffic will be sloweddown significantly; both
will get 10
11
Mbps, as analyzed in the first game.
Will the outcome of game be that of the first or the second game,or different from the
both? B is likely to get more than it gets in the first game, as long as it has an alternative
route which can send data much faster. Moreover, this time B is much stronger than it
was in the second game. It can access O even if A does not cooperate; moreover, he can
slow down A’s traffic from 10Mbps to less than 1 Mbps. This is due to the current 802.11
MAC protocol, which gives the packets from A and B equal chance to be transmitted.
One can expect this time the outcome is better for B.
We apply the same reasoning procedure as in Section 3.1.2 to see what the exact solu-
tion is. The normal-form game is represented by the matrix inTable 3.4. Normalization
of utility will yield the payoff matrix in Table 3.5.
Assume the strategy profile is
{p1(Cooperative, KeepSilent), p2(Cooperative, SendtoO),
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B
Keep Silent Sending to O Sending to A






Table 3.4: Payoff Matrix for the Third Game
p3(Cooperative, SendtoA), p4(Non− cooperative, KeepSilent),
p5(Non− cooperative, SendtoO), p6(Non− cooperative, SendtoA)}
wherepi ∈ [0, 1], and
∑6















































UA = 10p1 + 10p4 +
10
11
p5 + 5p6 (3.29)
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B
Keep Silent Send to O Send to A
A Cooperative (1,0) (0,1
5
) (0,1)







Table 3.5: Normalized Payoff Matrix for the Third Game






















whenA is non-cooperative (3.33)
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whenB sends to O (3.34)
The Raiffa solution is given by the following optimization problem:
MaximizeNUA under the constraint:
• NUA −NUB = SLA − SLB
•
∑6
i=1 pi = 1
• pi ∈ [0, 1]
Expressing all terms inpi the problem becomes:
Maximize
























p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 + p6 = 1 (3.37)
andpi ∈ [0, 1].











Eq. (3.35)+ Eq. (3.38) yields:
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Sincepi ≥ 0, for all i, from Eq. (3.39) and Eq. (3.37) we have:











Where “=” is valid if and only if p2 = p5 = p6 = 0. If p2 = p5 = p6 = 0, from
Eq. (3.36) we have




from Eq. (3.37) we have
p1 + p3 + p4 = 1 (3.43)




is maximized to be5
11










So B should send data to A for6
11
of the time and never try to connect to O directly.
A should forward all of the data received and send its own packets for 5
11
of the time.
These strategy lead to the outcome that A gets50
11
Mbps and B get30
11
Mbps. As expected,
this time the outcome is much more balanced as B’s ability to bargain is much stronger
than before.
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3.1.3.1 EXAMPLE OF COMPETITION
In this section we see that the nodes do not necessarily have to cooperate with each other.
Sometimes they compete for the bandwidth.
We now consider the scenario that is similar to that discussed above. However, we
now assume thatA can communicate withO at 10Mbps.B can accessA at 10Mbps,
and also accessO at 8Mbps. Intuitively, neither B nor A can benefit from cooperation,
because it costs more time for B’s packets to arrive at O if they are not transmitted
directly. A formal proof is shown as below.
The Payoff Matrix is given by:
B
Keep Silent Send to O Send to A






Table 3.6: Payoff Matrix for the Third Game
Note that forB, the strategies “Keep Silent” and “send to A” are both strictly dom-
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inated by “Send to O”. The only reasonable strategy for A whenB plays “Send to
O” is “Non-cooperative”. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of the game will be (Non-
cooperative, Sending to O), which is the same as the scenarioi the first game, where
nodes compete with each other to connect to O.
We will show it is impossible for any cooperative strategy tosurpass the Nash equi-
librium of the game. Assume the strategy profile is
{p1(Cooperative, KeepSilent), p2(Cooperative, SendtoO),
p3(Cooperative, SendtoA), p4(Non− cooperative, KeepSilent),
p5(Non− cooperative, SendtoO), p6(Non− cooperative, SendtoA)}
wherepi ∈ [0, 1], and
∑6
i=1 pi = 1. If both nodes get higher utility than they do in the


















































10p1 + 10p4 +
40
9











Eq. (3.45) leads to:




Eq. (3.46) leads to:
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Eq. (3.47)×8+ Eq. (3.48)×10 yields:
80p1 + 80p2 + 50p3 + 80p4 + 40p6 > 80(1− p5) (3.49)
80p1 + 80p2 + 50p3 + 80p4 + 80p5 + 40p6 > 80 (3.50)
Sincep3 ≥ 0, p6 ≥ 0, we have
80p1+80p2+80p3+80p4+80p5+80p6 ≥ 80p1+80p2+50p3+80p4+80p5+40p6 > 80
(3.51)
Therefore
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 + p6 > 1 (3.52)
Which contradicts with
∑6
i=1 pi = 1.
Therefore, it is impossible for any cooperative strategy tosurpass the Nash equilib-
rium of the game.
3.2 GENERAL SOLUTIONS
After studying four basic scenarios in two-nodes games, we present our general solutions
for two-nodes games in this section.
The generalized two-nodes game is as shown in Fig. 3.1(c) : There are two nodes,A
andB competing for a single access nodeO. The bandwidth is as follows: fromA to O,
x Mbps, fromB to O, z Mbps, andx > z. Instead of sending data directly, B also has
the option to send its packets to A with the hope that A will forwa d its packets. It is y
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Mbps fromB to A. SupposeA andB are rational, selfish, but agreed to try to cooperate
to maximize both’s utility; what is the best outcome which both would likely to agree to?
The payoff matrix for the game is shown in Table. 3.7:
B
Keep Silent Send to O Send to A


















Table 3.7: Payoff Matrix for the General Two-node game
Depending on the value of x,y and z, there may be different scenarios, as the examples













We study the game in each case.
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, “Send to O” is a dominant strategy for B; (Non-cooperative,
Send to O) is the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof:
If A plays “Cooperative”, then
UB(SendtoO) = z > 0 = UB(KeepSilent) (3.53)





















> 0 = UB(SendtoA) (3.56)
Therefore, no matter which strategyA plays, we always haveUB(SendingtoO) ≥
UB(SendingtoA) andUB(SendingtoO) ≥ UB(KeepSilent); therefore, all other strate-
gies forB are dominated by “Sending to O”. Similarly, we can show “Cooperative” is
dominated by “Non-cooperative” for A. Therefore, (Non-cooperative, Send to O) is the
Nash equilibrium of the game.






, no cooperative strategy improves the utility of both nodes
simultaneously compared with (Non-cooperative, Send to O).
Proof: Assume the cooperative strategy
{p1(Cooperative, KeepSilent), p2(Cooperative, SendtoO),
p3(Cooperative, SendtoA), p4(Non− cooperative, KeepSilent),
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p5(Non− cooperative, SendtoO), p6(Non− cooperative, SendtoA)}
wherepi ∈ [0, 1], and
∑6

















































































































, so Eq. (3.59) leads to:






























, so Eq. (3.60) leads to:
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Eq. (3.62)/x+ Eq. (3.64)/z yields:












) = 1− p5 (3.65)
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + +p5 + p6 > 1 (3.66)
which contradicts with the fact
∑6
i=1 pi = 1. Proof completed.
Lemma (1) and Lemma (2) show that there is no strategy such that both nodes get
higher utility than they do in the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium
consists of dominant strategies; therefore we have the following theorem:






, the outcome of the game must be (Non-cooperative, Send to





The casey = 0, where B cannot access A can be regarded as a special case in this
category.












, cooperation becomes possible. Before we try to find the cooperative
solution of the game, we have the following lemma to simplifyour work.
In the following discussion, we assume the cooperative strategy is
{p1(Cooperative, KeepSilent), p2(Cooperative, SendtoO),
p3(Cooperative, SendtoA), p4(Non− cooperative, KeepSilent),
p5(Non− cooperative, SendtoO), p6(Non− cooperative, SendtoA)}
wherepi ∈ [0, 1], and
∑6
i=1 pi = 1.






, for any given strategy characterized by(p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6),
there exists someq1, q3 ∈ [0, 1] such thatq1 + q3 = 1, and both nodes get at least the
same utility if they play the strategy characterized by(q1, 0, q3, 0, 0, 0).
50 CHAPTER 3. GAMES IN MANY-TO-ONE ROUTING
The lemma shows that any Pareto-efficient strategy should have p2 = p4 = p5 =





























































Let q1 = p1+p4+p6+wp5 andq3 = p2+p3+(1−w)p5; obviously,q1+q3 =
∑6
i=1 pi = 1,
andq1, q3 ∈ [0, 1]. We will show both nodes get at least the same utility if they plays the
strategy characterized by(q1, 0, q3, 0, 0, 0).

















x ≥ x (3.75)















Eq. (3.75)×(p1 + p4)+ Eq. (3.76)×p6+Eq. (3.74)×p5 yields:



























On the other hand,




































































Eq. (3.84)×p2+ Eq. (3.83)×p3+Eq. (3.82)×p5 yields:






















































































































































The utility vector(U ′A, U
′















































































From Eq. (3.89), Eq. (3.92), Eq. (3.78) and Eq. (3.86), we seeU ′A ≥ UA and
U ′B ≥ UB. Proof completed.
We now try to find the Raiffa solution for the game. Normalizedutility yields the
payoff matrix in Table (3.8)
B
Keep Silent Send to O Send to A





























Table 3.8: Normalized Payoff Matrix for the General Two-node game
By Lemma (3) we know any strategy that is Pareto efficient mustbe characterized by
(q1, 0, q3, 0, 0, 0). The Raiffa solution is Pareto efficient. So we can assume thedesired
strategy profile is p(Cooperative, Silent),q(Cooperative,Send to A), wherep, q ∈ [0, 1]
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andp + q = 1. Then we can write down the normalized utility and security level as
functions ofp andq:
NUA = p (3.93)



















We requireNUA −NUB = SLA − SLB, therefore,



























































Concluding the discussions in this section, we see for two nodes there are only two
cases, either completely competing or completely cooperating. We address the problem
by given the analytical formula for the strategy profile for each situation.
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3.3 MULTIPLE-NODE GAMES
The fact that only the most efficient path should be used does nt only apply to two-node
networks if we assume all nodes are within the same collisiondomain. The proof is as
follows. Suppose an inefficient route is used with non-zero probability in the strategy.
We rearrange the data sending along the inefficient way to be sent by the more efficient
route. This will cost less time since it is more efficient. Note that all the nodes still get
the same bandwidth but we have some extra time that may distributed to any route to
improve the benefits of at least one other node. In other words, there exist other strategy
profiles such that at least one node’s utility increases without any other node’s utility
decreasing. Therefore, by Pareto efficiency, it would be a better allocation.
3.3.1 ROUTING TREE
The wireless network can be regarded as a graph. Each particint of the network is a
node in the graph. The edges are the used network links between th nodes. As observed
above, only the most efficient path is ever used. Then we will get a confluent tree which
represents the topology of the network. This is usually refer d to as the routing tree of
the network formed by the shortest path. The gateway will be the root.
It is possible to recursively play two-player games to get thsolution for a multiple-
player game if they form a tree topology. A similar observation is discussed by Cheng et
al. [7]. There is some research of combinatorial agency which also resembles our ideas
[4].
3.3.2 GROUPS
To extend our solution to multi-node networks we first introduce the concept of group
and group coordinator. In this section we assume all the information is public.
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Definition 4 (Group) A group is a set of nodes which forms a subtree in the routing tree.
A group may consist of a node and its parent, or two or more competing nodes and
their parent. It may also contains smaller groups. A group ape rs to be a single node
to the outside and acts (either compete or cooperate) as a single node. After it gets the
bandwidth from the outside, it will share it within the groupaccording to the agreement
of the group memebers.
Definition 5 (Group Coordinator) The root of the subtree formed by the nodes of a
group is called the group coordinator.
The group coordinator acts as the representative of the group c mmunicating with
the outside world. It has the responsibility to forward packets from other nodes in the
group.
Some examples of groups are shown below:
(a) Ex. 1 (b) Ex. 2 (c) Ex. 3
Figure 3.2: Example of groups
In Fig. 3.2(a), Node C and D form a group, which cooperates with B. C is the group
coordinator, which will be in charge of distributing the resource between C and D.
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In Fig. 3.2(b), Node B,C,D form a group, which cooperates with A. Within the group,
B cooperates with C and D while C competes with D for resources.
In Fig. 3.2(c), Node B and C form a group, which competes with Dfor resources.
A group can be as large as the whole network with the gateway asthe root, or as
small as a single node. We have to determine how groups play games with each other.
There are two types of games: the competition game may happenamo g several groups;
the cooperation game may happen between a node and a group.
3.3.3 COMPETITION GAME BETWEEN GROUPS
As illustrated in Fig. 3.3, several groups are competing to connect to the parent. Each
small node may represent a group in the routing tree.
Definition 6 (Competition Factor) The competition factor for a group is the relative
proportion of time assigned to this group with respect to thesp ctrum time received by
the whole group. Each group is assigned a different competition factor, which sum up to
1.
Assume the group coordinator gets some spectrum time from its parent. Then it
divides the time into several slots according to the competition factors assigned to its
child groups. In each slot the coordinator makes a deal with acertain child group;i.e.,
forwards some packets from the group and sends its own packets for the rest of the time.
Each group tries to get more time (a bigger competition factor) to cooperate with the
group coordinator.
For a competition game, we have the following information:
• Groups involved in the game:G1, G2, G3, ..., Gn
• Their parent, P
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Figure 3.3: Competition between groups
• For each groupGk, k = 1, 2, 3, ..., n, we know the number of nodes in the group,
nk, as well as the nodesGk1, Gk2, ..., Gknk
• For each nodeGkm, we know the bandwidth from them toP , denoted byGkPm
Let TGk be thecompetition factorfor groupGk, k = 1, 2, ...n. To be fair to assign
the proper competition factor, we have to ensure that each group get enough proportion
of time such that no agent can benefit from deviating from the assignment. Any node’s
deviation from the assignment may lead to pure competition.In this case, all the nodes
just try to fight for bandwidth and try to connect to the subtree node directly. Denote the
time nodeGkm gets byTGkm; the following conditions will be true:







TGkm = 1 (3.100)
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Groupk(k = 1, 2, n) as a whole will get the following proportion of time, which we

















3.3.4 COOPERATIONGAME BETWEEN NODES AND SUBTREES
A cooperation game always happens between a node and a group,which may be as small
as a single node. As illustrated in Fig. 3.4, nodeO help forwarding the packets from the
groupG to P . As observed in the previous sections, in the optimal case nod O should
always forward all the packets fromG. The only uncertainty is the proportion of time
the link betweenG andO is active.
Definition 7 (Cooperation Factor) The cooperation factor for a group is the relative
proportion of time it is active when it is cooperating with its parent.
We wish to assign the groupG a cooperation factor. If nodeO, the parent of group
G, has only one child, then thecooperation factorwill be the relative time for groupG to
be active. Otherwise, in caseO has more than one child, the proportion of time for group
G being active should be the product of itscooperation factorandcompetition factor,
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since groupG should first compete with other groups for access toO, and then distribute
the time betweenO andG after that bargain.
Figure 3.4: Cooperation between a group and a node
For a cooperation game, we have the following information:
• Participants of the game: GroupG and NodeO
• For groupG, we know the number of nodes in the group,n, as well as the nodes
G0, G1, G2, ..., Gn, whereG0 is the group coordinator
• For each nodeGk, k = 0, 1, 2, ...n, we know the bandwidth from them toP and to
O, denoted byGPk andG
O
k
• Bandwidth fromO to P is OP
Denote the cooperation factor, the timeG is sending in 1 second, byC. The through-
put of groupG would be:
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UG = G
O
0 × C (3.104)
The throughput of nodeO would be:
UO = (1− C − CG
O
0 /OP )×OP (3.105)
The minimal throughput of both parties may be zero. The maximum possible through-









The maximum possible throughput for nodeO is OP .










NUO = 1− C − CG
O
0 /OP (3.108)
The security level of G would be the sum of all its members’ throughput in case there
is no cooperation;i.e.,
SLG =











Where|X| denotes the number of elements in the finite setX.
The security level of O is a little more difficult to determine. Some nodes will try to
access P directly, and some may just bother O by interfering wth O’s ability to transmit.
The security level is:














|{k : GOk 6= 0}|
(3.110)
The Raiffa solution suggests findingC to maximizeNU(G) under the constraint:
• NUG −NUO = SLG − SLO
• 0 ≤ C, NUG, NUO ≤ 1
Solving for C we have:
C =








Being able to find the equilibrium of both kinds of games that my appear in a network,
the solution algorithm can recursively solve the game. The basic idea of the algorithm
is that the gateway distributes bandwidth among the severallargest groups; then each
group coordinator recursively distributes the resource among its subgroups. Subgroups
compete with each other, and cooperate with the group coordinator such that the group
coordinator forwards data for the subgroups.
We assume the tree topology is given, and all the link-quality infomation needed is
known. Every node maintains two numbers, nodeShare and treeShar , which are the
share distributed to the node and the subtree with the node asthe root. Then Algorithm
1 calculates the proper share for each node:
The function solve(A), where A is a node in the network, worksas stated in Algo-
rithm 2:
The complexity of the algorithm isO(n2), where n is the number of nodes in the net-
work. In algorithm 1, the function “solve()” will be called exactly n times. In algorithm
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Algorithm 1 Solution for multiple nodes game




if A is not a leafthen
n = number of A’s first-level children
B = set of A’s first-level children
BWXY = Bandwidth from X to Y
Play a competition game amongB1, B2, . . . , Bn
for i = 1 . . . n do
Bi.treeShare← Bi’s competition factor× A.treeShare
if A is not the gatewaythen
P = A’s parent
Play a cooperation game betweenBi and A
Bi.treeShare← Bi’s cooperation factor×Bi.treeShare
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2, most steps are within constant time. only the for loop may involve at mostO(n) steps.
Therefore, the complexity of the algorithm isO(n2)
3.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We have implemented the algorithm presented in the previoussection. Given any tree
topology and link quality information, the program is able to calculate the proper band-
width sharing according to the Raiffa solution.
We list several examples here to illustrate the results given by the algorithm.
3.5.1 THE POWER OF THREATENING
Experiments show that with a potential alternative link, nodes get much better throughput
even if the link is never used in the optimal Equilibrium. It is the ability to disrupt
communication of the other party that makes the improvementpossible.
In Fig. 3.5(a), two nodesA andB are trying to access the gatewayG, and the
outcome is:
• Throughput of Node 1: 7.5Mbps
• Throughput of Node 2: 1.25Mbps
In Fig. 3.5(b),B has an alternative link toG. This time, the outcome is:
• Throughput of Node 1: 4.4Mbps
• Throughput of Node 2: 2.8Mbps
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: The power of threatening
3.5.2 CHAINS
Our studies show that even in the view of game theory, distantnodes tend to get starved.
This should not be a big surprise to us. Distant nodes have very few, or even no contribu-
tion to the network at all. It costs other nodes great effort tforward their traffic. There
is no hope they should get equal throughput as other nodes.
Figure 3.6: Distant nodes get starved
In Fig. 3.6, we assume each node can communicate with its neighbor at 10Mbps.
The outcome of the game is:
• Throughput of Node 1: 7.64Mbps
• Throughput of Node 2: 0.956Mbps
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• Throughput of Node 3: 0.12Mbps
• Throughput of Node 4: 0.02Mbps
If we assume in addition to the 10Mbps link with the neighbors, nodes can commu-
nicate with each other at 1Mbps, the outcome is more balanced, but centered nodes still
enjoy a higher shares:
• Throughput of Node 1: 4.76Mbps
• Throughput of Node 2: 1.42Mbps
• Throughput of Node 3: 0.43Mbps
• Throughput of Node 4: 0.28Mbps
We are not alone. Leino [15] shows consistent results. In hissimulation, the nodes
in the center of the network always tend to escape from the network, which results in the
next centered node wishing to escape. Our study also suggests that to keep the interest
of the center node to stay in the network, it should be assigned very high bandwidth.
3.5.3 SYMMETRY
Let us study another example.
Assuming all links shown in Fig. 3.7 are 10Mbps, the game generates the following
outcome:
• Throughput of Node 1: 2.51Mbps
• Throughput of Node 2: 3.35Mbps
• Throughput of Node 3: 2.51Mbps
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Figure 3.7: Another example
• Throughput of Node 4: 0.21Mbps
• Throughput of Node 5: 0.21Mbps
• Throughput of Node 6: 0.31Mbps
• Throughput of Node 7: 0.05Mbps
Again we see the nodes get less throughput as they are furtherf om the gateway.
Moreover, we see that symmetric nodes in the network get the same throughput, which
naturally makes sense. Nodes 4 and 5 get the same throughput because they are sym-
metric in the network. Nodes 1 and 3 get the same throughput becaus both of they have
the same link quality to the gateway and both of them have children with the same link
quality.
Now we assume there are additional links between every two nodes in the network
with the link quality of 1Mbps; the outcome would be different:
• Throughput of Node 1: 2.23Mbps
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• Throughput of Node 2: 0.24Mbps
• Throughput of Node 3: 2.13Mbps
• Throughput of Node 4: 0.71Mbps
• Throughput of Node 5: 0.71Mbps
• Throughput of Node 6: 0.65Mbps
• Throughput of Node 7: 0.41Mbps
The surprise may be the fact that this time node 2 gets the poorest throughput. How-
ever, if the cooperation senario is broken, all nodes just try to connect to the gateway by
their competition; then all nodes will get a throughput of 0.232 Mbps. Therefore it is
still beneficial for node 2 to accept the equilibrium. For theother nodes, it is obviously
much better than the non-cooperative case. However, due to the verhead of protocols,
the improvements is so small to make the solution impractical. This is a simplified math-
ematic model and a lot of further work should be done. We also notice that simplifying
the multi-node game to recursively two-node game may lose some information and lead
to some problems. We will keep studying in future works.
These examples show the fact that nodes that act as a important r uter in the center of
the network get the highest throughput. The fewer hops it is away from the gateway, the
higher the throughput it gets; likewise, if the node acts as arouter for many other nodes.
3.5.4 LIMITATIONS
Our algorithm assumes the whole network is within a single clique. Therefore, there are
no concurrent trasmissions in the network. While this may betru if the network is small
and all nodes are within the interference range of each other, it does not apply to larger
networks. We will address this problem in the following chapter.
4 REALISTIC SOLUTIONS AND SIMULATIONS
The algorithm in Chapter 4 only works within a single clique;i. ., we assumed all the
nodes are within the same collision domain. Therefore, the algorithm works well only if
the network is small. For larger networks we need further tools t study and analyze the
problem.
Interference and collision [23] are a nontrivial problems to deal with. For example,
the nodes 1,2 and 3 in Fig. 4.1 are within each other’s interfer nce range; therefore they
cannot transmit at the same time. Moreover, nodes 2, 3 and 4 are also within each other’s
interference range. However, node 4 can transmit to node 3 while node 1 transmits to the
gateway as long as linkl1 and linkl4 are not in each other’s interference range.
Figure 4.1: Interference range in a chain
In larger networks the problem may be even more complicated.Fortunately, there
has already been some research to study this problem.
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4.1 RELATED WORK
By adopting the concepts of link-usage matrix and medium-usage matrix, people man-
aged to achieve a certain form of fairness in their simulations. These works are intro-
duced by Jakubczah et al. [12]. We first have a look how these matrices work.
Before we introduce the matrix, we list all our notations below:
• number of streams in the network:n
• number of links in the network:m
• streams in the network:s1, s2, . . . , sn
• throughput of streamsi: Ri, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
• links in the network:l1, l2, . . . , lm
• link capacity of linkli: Ci, i = 1, 2, . . . , m
• collision domain for linkli: ui ⊂ {l1, l2, . . . , lm}, i = 1, 2, . . . , m







1, if streamsj uses linkli;
0, otherwise;
The link-usage matrix provide us with the information aboutwhich links are in-
volved in each stream. To also included the link-capacity information, we define the
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The third matrix M is called the medium-usage matrix, which is am × m matrix
defined as:






1, if lj ∈ ui;
0, otherwise;
The stream-throughput vectorR is defined as:
R = (R1, R2, . . . , Rn)
T (4.2)
The constraint of the throughput of the streams in a network can be represented by
the following formula:
ML′R ≤ 1m (4.3)
Where1m is a m-dimensional vector(1, 1, 1...1)T .
Note thatM is am×m matrix,L′ is am×n matrix, andR is an×1 matrix, therefore
bothML′R and1m are m-dimensional vector. Thus, the above vector inequality ctually
contains n numerical inequalities.
We use the senario in Fig. 4.1 as an example to show how to calculate the absolute
fairness share with the matrix.
• number of streams in the network:n = 4
• number of links in the network:m = 4
• streams in the network:s1, s2, s3, s4, wheresi denotes the stream originated from
nodei to the gateway.
• throughput of streamsi: Ri, i = 1, 2, 3, 4
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• links in the network:l1, l2, l3, l4
• link capacity of linkli: Ci, i = 1, 2, 3, 4
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By the definition of absolute fairness,R1 = R2 = R3 = R4 = R, therefore,
R = (R1, R1, R1, R1)
T (4.4)
Finally, the constraint can be expressed as:
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)× R1 ≤ 1 (4.8)












SoR1 is the fair share for the four nodes if absolute fairness is applied.
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4.2 OUR SOLUTION
Our work may be considered as an extension of the above work. Instead of absolute
fairness, we take game playing into account.
The core idea of the Raiffa solution is that the difference betwe n the normalized
security level of agents should be maintained in their final assigned normalized utility.
Therefore, when we maximize the normalized utility of any agent, the normalized utility
of all agents reach their maximum.
Recall that, in the previous section, with the goal of absolute fairness, we have the
following constraint:
R = (R1, R1, R1, R1)
T (4.10)
If we replace this constraint with the constraint that the difference between the nor-
malized utilities of agents should be maintained, we get anoher solution, which meets
all the interference constraints as well as implements the Raiffa-solution concept.
To implement the solution, we have to address two critical problems: How to nor-
malized the utiltiy of each node? How to find out the securtiy leve of each node?
The former problem is relatively easier to address. LetX be any node in the net-













RX , if stream i is originated from node X
0, otherwise;
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The latter problem is difficult to address. In a large network, it is not clear what is the
minimum bandwidth a node can guarantee itself. However, as long as there are so many
nodes in the network, if all the other nodes act against one ofthem, then it is very likely
that the actual bandwidth that node gets will be approximately z ro. In other words, all
the nodes have very low, if not zero, security level. Moreover, if we assume nodes can
perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by continually broadc sting, then every node
does have zero security level, as any of them can perform a DoSattack and stop every
node from transmitting. Therefore, we adopt an approximation in our final solution: we
assume all nodes have zero security level. This may not be true, but it should be very
close to the reality.
We will use the example from Section 4.1 to show how we calculate the fair share.
The network topology is the same as shown in Fig. 4.1. We use the same notations as in
Section 4.1. The matricesM ,L, andL′ are the same as in Section 4.1.
First we normalize the utility of the nodes. To find the normalized utility of node 1,
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Solving these inequalities we find the maximal possible value for R1 ≤ C1. There-











Similarly, the solution ofR2 in Eq.( 4.3) whenR = (0, R2, 0, 0)T yields theMAXU2 :
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Similarly, the solution ofR4 in Eq. ( 4.3) whenR = (0, 0, 0, R4)T yields the
MAXU4:
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Since we assume zero security level, the requirement of
NUX −NUY = SLX − SLY
whereX, Y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} leads to
NU1 = NU2 = NU3 = NU4 (4.15)
































as our fairness constraint. Finally, letR = (R1, R2, R3, R4) where
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4.3 SIMULATION AND DISCUSSIONS
We implement our solution in the Shoshin ns2 simulation testb d[lily]. A source-rate-
control algorithm limits the rate of each stream. We modifiedthe piece of code that
calculates the fair share for each node.
We use the ns-2 simulator to do the simulation. The default physical interface has
transmission range of 250.0 meters and interference range of 550.0 meters. We set the
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MacDataRate to be 1Mbps for each link. The link capacity is 860 kbps. We used a
packetSize of 1500 bytes. The simulation runs for 125 seconds.
We implement the simulation of the scenario depicted in Fig.4.2, where we place
the nodes 200 meters apart.
Figure 4.2: Simulation set up
Initially we use TCP traffic without our fairness algorithm,and the throughputs of the
four streams are shown in Fig. 4.3. We then turn our algorithmon, and the throughputs
of the streams are shown in Fig. 4.4.
We see several things from the simulation:
1. The relative order of the throughputs of the streams are almost the same in both
cases
2. The centered nodes get worse throughput in our solution. In Fig. 4.3, stream 1
get more than 200 kbps most of the time, while in Fig. 4.4 we cansee that in our
solution, stream 1 gets only 150kbps.
3. The distant nodes get better throughput in our solution. In Fig. 4.3, stream 5 get
starved some times, and the average throughput is around 20kbps, while in Fig.
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Figure 4.3: TCP without fairness
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Figure 4.4: TCP with fairness
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4.4 we can see that in our solution, stream 5 gets stable 30Kbps. The throughput
of node 3 and 4 are also improved a little.
The simulation results make sense. The relative order of thethroughputs of the nodes
is maintained; therefore the solution of our algorithm reflects the different cost for the
nodes to access the gateway. On the other hand, the balanced assignment prevents far
away nodes from starving.
4.4 TEMPORAL FAIRNESS AND OUR SOLUTIONS
In the examples in Section 4.1 and 4.2, our fair share assignments are the same as in the
definition of temporal fairness. This is non-trivial. We canshow our solution does lead
to temporal fairness.
In temporal fairness, each stream takes the same amount of spectrum time to arrive
at the gateway, subject to the max-min limitations.
Recall in our solution, we assume cooperation and require:
NUi −NUj = SLi − SLj
where




for every twoi, j.






for every two nodei, j.
whereMAXUi is the throughput nodei gets when there is only one stream fromi to
the gateway in the network. Therefore,Ti
MAXUi
equals the spectrum time for the stream
from node i to the gateway. Therefore, the requirement becoms “the spectrum time for
stream from node i= the spectrum time for the stream from node j” for every two nodes
i, j. This is exactly what temporal fairness claims.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis we proposed our work in applying game theory inad hocnetworks (as
well as wireless mesh networks) to determine the proper resou ce distribution among the
nodes. A framework algorithm is proposed, simulations are performed and discussed.
The thesis is organized in the order we studied the problem. We first did a brief
survey ofad hocand wireless mesh networks, and evaluated the related research in this
field. Then we studied the simplest two-node games. By parameterizing the action space,
we reduce the game to a normal-form game with mixed-strategyspace. Since the Nash
equilibrium is not always Pareto optimal we looked for a soluti n using cooperative game
theory. We adopted the Raiffa solution.
The Raiffa solution is the best solution concept we feel reason ble. However, there
may be other solution ideas that are also good in this case. Note that the solution is
independent of the framework algorithm, so one can readily choose other solution ideas
and still make use of the framework to address the problem.
Then we studied ways to extend our work to multiple nodes. We reduce the network
to a tree, which leads to the recursive-solution idea.
After that, we take the interference range into account and amore realistic algorithm
is presented. Combined with existing source-rate-controlalgorithms, we have validated
our work by simulation.
Finally, we found out that our solution from the cooperative-game view coincides
with temporal fairness, which goes beyond our expectation.
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5.1 FUTURE WORK
Some assumptions in our algorithm, like the topology knowledge is known to every node,
need to be justified. It is possible that local topology knowledge would be enough, but
further works needs to be done to make it clear.
The model in the thesis implements the simplest utility function and normalization to
convert the throughput to the normalized utility. Our utility function is simplyU(X) =
X; our normalization is just the linear transformation. It may be better to introduce other
utility functions and normalization procedure to model thegame and get results other
than temporal fairness.
We may also consider other solution concept like Nash bargain equilibrium, and see
if the outcome is different.
Finally, more simulations with different settings are required to study and validate
the model better.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Lee, S. Banerjee, and B. Bhattacharjee. The case for a multi-hop wireless local
area network. CS-TR 4504, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 2004.
[2] Vikram Srinivasan, Pavan Nuggehalli, CarlaFabiana Chiasserini, and Ramesh R.
Rao. Cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of IEEE Infocom,
2003, available from http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/srinivasan03cooperation.html.
[3] Ian F. Akyildiz, Xudong Wang, and Weilin Wang. Wireless mesh networks: a
survey. InComputer Networks and ISDN Systems, volume 47, March 2005.
[4] Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, and Noam Nisan. Combinatori l agency. In
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 18–28,
2006.
[5] L. Buttyan and J. Hubaux. Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad
hoc networks. available from http://citeseer.ist.psu.ed/buttyan01stimulating.html.
[6] Shigang Chen and Zhan Zhang. Localized algorithm for aggre ate fairness in wire-
less sensor networks. InProceedings of the 12th Annual International Conference
on Mobile Computing and Networking, pages 274–285, 2006.
[7] Cheng Tien Ee and Ruzena Bajcsy. Congestion control and firness for many-to-
one routing in sensor networks. InProceedings of the 2nd International Conference
on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, pages 148–161, 2004.
[8] Robinson et al. Measurement driven deployment of a two-tier urban mesh access
network. Available from http://www.ece.rice.edu/ camp/sys7122-camp.pdf.
85
86 REFERENCES
[9] Z. Fang and B. Bensaou. Fair bandwidth sharing algorithms based on game theory
frameworks for wireless ad-hoc networks. InProceedings of the IEEE Infocom,
2004. Available from http://www.ieee-infocom.org/2004/Papers/274.PDF.
[10] Violeta Gambiroza, Bahareh Sadeghi, and Edward W. Knightly. End-to-end perfor-
mance and fairness in multihop wireless backhaul networks.In Mobile Computing
and Networking, pages 287–301, 2004.
[11] Michael Hauspie and Isabelle Simplot-Ryl. Cooperation in ad hoc networks: En-
hancing the virtual currency based models. InProceedings of the First International
Conference on Integrated Internet Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, 2006. Available
from http://www2.lifl.fr/ hauspie/uploads/Hauspie/inters nse06.pdf.
[12] Szymon Jakubczak, Alex T. K. Lau, Lily Li, and Paul A.S. Ward. Feasibility-
based rate-control fairness algorithm for wirelss mesh networks. Available at
http://galera.ii.pw.edu.pl/ sjakubcz/sdm1/SzymonJakubczak.esej.pdf.
[13] Kamran Jamshaid, Lily Li, and Paul A.S. Ward. Gateway contr l
of wireless mesh networks. in WiMeshNets, 2006, Available from
http://www.ccng.uwaterloo.ca/ pasward/Publications/GRC.pdf.
[14] F. P. Kelly, A.K. Maulloo, and D.K.H. Tan. Rate control in communication net-
works: Shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability. The Operational Re-
search Society, 49:237–252, 1998.
[15] Juha Leino. Applications of Game Theory in Ad Hoc Networks. Master thesis
in Department of Engineering Physics and Mathematics, Helsinki University OF
Technology, 2003.
REFERENCES 87
[16] R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa.Games and decisions, introduction and critical
survey. 1989. Harvard University Press.
[17] Mohammad Ahmad Munawar.Multi-interface Multi-channel Wireless Mesh Net-
works. Master thesis in Dept of ECE, University of Waterloo, 2004.
[18] John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.Theory of Games and Economic Be-
havior. Princeton University Press, 1953.
[19] Dusit Niyato and Ekram Hossain. A game-theoretic approach to bandwidth alloca-
tion and admission control for polling services in ieee 802.16 broadband wireless
networks. InProceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Qualityof Service
in Heterogeneous Wired/Wireless Networks, 2006.
[20] Bozidar Radunovic and Jean-Yves Le Boudec. Rate performance objectives of
multihop wireless networks. InIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, October
2004. Available from http://www.ieee-infocom.org/2004/Papers/395.PDF.
[21] Howard Raiffa.Arbitration schemes for generalized two-person games. in Annals
of Mathematics Btudies, No. 28, Princeton, 1953.
[22] R. Ramanathan and J. Redi. A brief overview of ad hoc networks: challenges and
directions. InCommunications Magazine, IEEE, volume 30, May 2002.
[23] Sumit Rangwala, Ramakrishna Gummadi, Ramesh Govindan, and Konstantinos
Psounis. Interference-aware fair rate control in wirelesssensor networks. InPro-
ceedings of ACM SIGCOMM Symposium on Network Architecturesand Protocols,
September 2006. Available from http://www.cs.bu.edu/groups/nrg/papers/f06/09-
25-niky.pdf.
88 REFERENCES
[24] W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitiv sealed tenders. InJour-
nal of Finance, pages 8–37, 1961.
[25] Alec Woo and David E. Culler. A transmission control scheme for media access in
sensor networks. InMobile Computing and Networking, pages 221–235, 2001.
[26] S. Zhong, Y. Yang, and J. Chen. A Simple, Cheat-proof, Credit-based
System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Technical Report Yale/DCS/TR1235,
Department of Computer Science, Yale University, 2002, avail ble from
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/zhong02sprite.html.
